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Amelia Parsons* 
A Race to Digitization?: Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & 
Sons Impact on the Digital Publication Market 
I. Introduction 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. changed the 
landscape of American copyright law.1  The Court established an international 
copyright exhaustion regime, a system that applies the first sale doctrine of 17 
U.S.C. § 109(a) to the first purchase of a copyrighted work manufactured outside of 
the United States.2  The holding in Kirtsaeng resolved an ongoing dispute in the 
circuits as to whether a copyright holder’s right to importation set out in 17 U.S.C. 
§ 602(a)(1) is limited by the first sale doctrine.3  Copyright holders want the right to 
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 1. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013) [Hereinafter 
“Kirstsaeng”].  
 2. Id. at 1356, see also 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2010) (“Notwithstanding the 
provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord 
lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, 
without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the 
possession of that copy or phonorecord.”). 
 3. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)  (2010) (“Importation. —Importation into the United 
States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or 
phonorecords of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an 
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control importation of their copyrighted works in order to geographically segment 
markets and control prices; consumers of the copyrighted works want copyright 
holders to have fewer controls over importation and distribution so that consumers 
can benefit from access to low-cost grey market goods.4 
The policy rationale behind copyright exhaustion is that once a copyright holder 
receives “just compensation” for the first legal sale of a copy of a copyrighted 
product, the copyright holder has no further right to exert ownership or collect 
compensation from subsequent sales of that copy.5  Therefore, after the first legal 
sale, the rights of the copyright holder to the particular product are terminated, or 
“exhausted.”6  After a careful analysis of the relevant statutory language, the Court 
in Kirstaeng justified its holding by reasoning that copyright owners cannot wield 
unlimited control over subsequent sales of works.7 The Court’s ruling exhausts a 
copyright owner’s control over a particular copy after the first legal sale of that 
copy, regardless of where the copy is sold or manufactured.8 
The Copyright Act provides copyright holders with six exclusive rights, including 
the rights to distribution and reproduction.9  The first sale doctrine restricts a 
copyright holder’s exclusive right to distribution articulated in § 106(3).10  In 1908, 
the Supreme Court first articulated the first sale doctrine in Bobbs Merrill Co. v. 
Straus, stating that a copyright holder’s control over a particular copy of a 
copyrighted work ends at the first lawful sale.11  Since Bobbs Merrill, the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Quality King Distributors v. L’Anza Research International added 
to the confusion of the already ambiguous Copyright Act.12  Kirtsaeng is the Court’s 
latest attempt to clarify questions left open by Quality King. While the Court 
succeeded in reaffirming the strength of the first sale doctrine in American 
 
infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106, actionable under 
section 501.”). 
 4. Alexander B. Pope, Note, A Second Look at First Sale: An International Look at U.S. Copyright 
Exhaustion, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 201, 206 (2011).  Grey market goods are different from counterfeit or pirated 
materials because they are made with the authorization of the copyright holder and imported from a foreign 
state of manufacture.  Id. at 205–06. 
 5. Id. at 204. 
 6. Id. at 206. 
 7. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1362. 
 8. Id. at 1371. 
 9. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2010). 
 10. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2010) (“Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title 
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: . . . (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords 
of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending . . . .”). 
 11. 201 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908). 
 12. 523 U.S. 135, 148 (1998). 
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copyright law,13 the holding may prove to be effectively insignificant in light of the 
general shift towards purely digital works.14 
Digital technology has ushered in a shift from physical copies to cheaper digital 
works.15  Copyright holders may be able to avoid the pitfalls of Kirtsaeng completely 
by switching copyrighted products over to a digital format and offering consumers 
end user license agreements (“EULAs”).16  On one hand, a move towards EULAs 
restricting consumer uses could have a detrimental impact on consumers and 
negate the purposes of the Kirtsaeng ruling, but on the other hand, physical and 
actual ownership may be less important in a digital age, as demonstrated by the 
success of other product licensing platforms. 
Kirtsaeng may very well speed up the process of a publisher crossover to 
predominately digital products,17 but this is not necessarily detrimental to 
consumers in the long-term.  Part II of this paper outlines the origins of the first 
sale doctrine and the sections of the Copyright Act at issue in Kirtsaeng.  Part III 
examines the impact of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Quality King, specifically, the 
resulting circuit split as to the treatment of copyrighted products manufactured 
outside the United States.  Part IV explores the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kirtsaeng as an attempt to remedy the conflict between the first sale doctrine and a 
copyright holder’s exclusive right to importation. Part V provides an overview of 
the grey market and the policy implications for different copyright exhaustion 
regimes. Finally, Part VI explains EULAs and the possible real-life implications of 
the holding in Kirtsaeng. 
II. The Exclusive Right to Distribution 
Article I § 8 cl. 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power to 
issue copyrights to encourage the creative works of artists and authors.18 The 
codified copyright laws regulate how authors and consumers exercise their rights to 
create and purchase works. Copyright exhaustion ends the copyright holder’s ability 
 
 13. See generally, Clark D. Asay, Kirtsaeng and the First-Sale Doctrine’s Digital Problem, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 17 (2013) (describing the relationship between the holdings in Quality King and Kirtsaeng). 
 14. Id. at 23. 
 15. See Adrian Covert, A decade of iTunes singles killed the music industry, CNN MONEY, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/04/25/technology/itunes-music-decline/index.html (April 29, 2013, 6:09 PM) (“By 
2007 . . . those inexpensive digital singles overtook CDs – by a wide margin – generating 819 million sales to just 
500 million for the CD.”). 
 16. Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy Ownership: First Sales and Essential 
Copies, 25 BERKLEY TECH. L. J. 1887, 1895 (2010) (explaining that EULAs are often not subject to first sale 
doctrine limitations on a copyright holders exclusive right to distribution). 
 17. S. Zubin Gautam, The Murky Waters of First Sale: Price Discrimination and Downstream Control in the 
Wake of Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 29 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 717, 719 (2014). 
 18. US CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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to control the sale or importation of a good into other markets after the first legal 
sale of the copyrighted product.19 
 
A. The Origins of the First Sale Doctrine 
The Supreme Court first articulated the first sale doctrine and the issue of copyright 
exhaustion in the 1908 case Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.20  In Bobbs-Merrill, the 
publishing company Bobbs-Merrill Co. (“Bobbs-Merrill”) placed a notice in the 
cover of the book The Castaway stating that shall not be sold for less than one dollar 
per copy.21  Macy’s Stores bought copies of The Castaway from wholesale dealers 
and sold the copies for a retail price of eighty-nine cents per copy, despite the 
copyright notice stipulating the retail price of one dollar.22  The Supreme Court 
ruled that once a copy of a book was purchased, the publisher no longer had any 
right to control the resale price of such copies.23  The right to publish and vend as 
permitted in the Copyright Act did not permit Bobbs-Merrill to impose restrictions 
on subsequent owners of the copies of the book.24 
In 1909, Congress revised the Copyright Act to codify the 1908 Bobbs-Merrill 
decision on copyright exhaustion.  In 1976 the language was changed to its current 
version in 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), which reads: “Notwithstanding the provisions of 
section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under 
this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority 
of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or 
phonorecord.”25 The rewording of the first sale doctrine in § 109(a) and the 
addition of seemingly conflicting provisions explored further in the next section 
paved the way for Kirtsaeng. 
B. The Sections of the Copyright Act at Issue in Kirtsaeng 
Kirtsaeng involves the interplay between three sections of the Copyright Act: § 106, 
§ 109(a), and § 602(a)(1).  The seemingly contradictory wording of § 109(a) and § 
602(a)(1) caused confusion in the circuits as to how to treat copyrighted products 
manufactured outside the United States that are subsequently imported into the 
United States. 
 
 19. Alexander B. Pope, Note, A Second Look at First Sale: An International Look at U.S. Copyright 
Exhaustion, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 201, 205 (2011). 
 20. 201 U.S. 339, 346 (1908). 
 21. Id. at 341. 
 22. Id. at 342. 
 23. Id. at 350. 
 24. Id. 
 25. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
  A Parsons 
Journal of Business & Technology Law Proxy 5 
Section 106 sets out the basic exclusive rights granted to copyright holders, 
including the right to reproduce and distribute copies of copyrighted products.26  
The words “Subject to sections 107 through 122” places limitations on the exclusive 
rights set out for copyright holders.  One of those limitations is the first sale 
doctrine codified as § 109.27  The first sale doctrine of § 109(a) states, “[the] owner 
of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person 
authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, 
to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”28  Thus, 
under the Copyright Act, copyright holders possess the exclusive right to 
distribution of a particular copy of a copyrighted work until that copy is sold. 
The confusion in Kirtsaeng arises because of the disconnect between § 109(a) 
and § 602(a)(1), which grants the copyright holder the exclusive right to 
importation of copyrighted works.29  The section states that it is an infringement on 
the copyright holder’s exclusive right to distribution for a person to import a copy 
into the United States without the copyright holder’s authorization.30  The conflict 
between the first sale doctrine and the exclusive right to importation is apparent: if 
a person purchases a copy of a copyrighted work outside the United States, and 
then subsequently resells the copy within the United States, it is unclear whether the 
first sale doctrine under § 109 protects the purchaser, or if the subsequent 
importation and resale is a violation of the exclusive right to distribution as 
outlined in § 602(a)(1). 
III. Quality King Distributors v. L’Anza Research International: the 
Supreme Court’s Failed Attempt to Clarify the Copyright Act 
 
 26. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2010). “Subject to [17 U.S.C. §§ 107 through 122], the owner of copyright under this 
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:  
(1)  to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;  
(2)  to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3)  to distribute copies or phonorecords of 
the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4)  in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and 
other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; 
(5)  in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the 
copyrighted work publicly; and 
(6)  in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission.” 
 27. Id. 
 28. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2010). 
 29. 17 U.S.C. § 602 (2010). “(a)  Infringing importation or exportation.—(1) Importation.—Importation 
into the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or 
phonorecords of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the exclusive 
right to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106, actionable under section 501. 
 30. Id. 
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The Court in Quality King addressed the issue of international exhaustion of 
copyrights after the first legal sale of a copyrighted product, but failed to definitively 
settle the conflict between the right of first sale and the right of copyright owners to 
control unapproved imports.31  Quality King is distinguishable from Kirtsaeng 
because it deals with a product with copyrighted packaging as opposed to being a 
copyrighted product such as a book or piece of software.32  However, Quality King 
left open the question of whether or not a product manufactured outside the 
United States and subsequently imported into the United States would infringe on a 
copyright holder’s § 602(a)(1) exclusive right to distribution through importation.33 
A. Quality King Answers One Question While Posing Another 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Quality King to determine whether goods 
bearing copyrighted labels, which were manufactured within the United States and 
then shipped internationally, were barred from importation and sale in the United 
States because of the grant of the exclusive right to importation to a copyright 
holder under 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1).34  The Court held that because the copyrighted 
material was on a product that had been manufactured within the United States, 
sold and shipped overseas, and then imported back into the United States, the first 
sale doctrine was a viable defense for the purchasers of the copyrighted product.35 
L’Anza Research International (“L’Anza”) sold hair care products packaged in 
bottles with copyrighted labels to authorized salons and barbershops within the 
United States.36  To distribute its products over seas, L’Anza contracted with 
international distributors to sell their products in foreign markets at a price 35-40% 
lower than retail prices within the United States.37  Three cases of hair care products 
manufactured in the United States and packaged with L’Anza copyrighted labels 
were sold to an authorized distributor in the United Kingdom.38  Through a series 
of transactions, the cases of L’Anza products were sold to a company in Malta.39  
The cases ultimately came back to the U.S. through a purchase by Quality King 
 
 31. See generally Quality King Distribs. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135 (1998) (holding only that 
those products made within the U.S., legally sold to international distributors, and then sold again in the U.S. 
are subject to the first sale doctrine). 
 32. Quality King Distribs. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135, 138 (1998). 
 33. See infra Part III A. 
 34. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 138. 
 35. Id. at 145. 
 36. Id. at 138. 
 37. Id. at 139. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. 
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Distributors, Inc. who sold them for below retail value to unauthorized retailers in 
the United States.40 
The Court held that the copyright holder’s right to importation is not applicable 
to the lawful owner’s resale of the copyrighted products, regardless of whether the 
resellers are foreign or domestic.41 Specifically, the Court found that “§ 602(a) 
applies to a category of copies that were neither piratical nor ‘lawfully made under 
this title.’ That category encompasses copies that were ‘lawfully made’ not under the 
United States Copyright Act, but instead, under the law of some other country.”42  
This statement seems to imply that copyrighted products lawfully made outside the 
United States and then imported without the copyright holder’s authorization 
infringe on the copyright holder’s right to control importation. 
Furthering the ambiguity, the Court poses a hypothetical expressly stating that a 
distributor authorized to sell copyrighted works in a foreign country infringes on 
the copyright holder’s rights of importation and distribution if the distributor 
subsequently sells the copyrighted products in the United States: 
Even in the absence of a market allocation agreement between, for example, 
a publisher of the United States edition and a publisher of the British 
edition of the same work, each such publisher could make lawful copies. If 
the author of the work gave the exclusive United States distribution rights—
enforceable under the Act—to the publisher of the United States edition and 
the exclusive British distribution rights to the publisher of the British 
edition, however, presumably only those made by the publisher of the 
United States edition would be “lawfully made under this title” within the 
meaning of § 109(a). The first sale doctrine would not provide the publisher 
of the British edition who decided to sell in the American market with a 
defense to an action under § 602(a) (or, for that matter, to an action under 
§ 106(3), if there was a distribution of the copies).43 
Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring opinion, emphasized that the hypothetical 
posed is mere dicta and that the Court was only attempting to resolve a dispute 
regarding copyrighted products made in the United States, sold to a foreign 
distributor, and subsequently sold again in the United States.44  She notes that, 
despite the hypothetical, the Court does not attempt to address cases in which 
alleged infringing imports were of copyrighted products manufactured abroad.45 
 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 145. 
 42. Id. at 147. 
 43. Id. at 148. 
 44. Id. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 45. Id. 
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The hypothetical posed by the Court in Quality King caused a circuit split over 
the treatment of copyrighted goods manufactured abroad and imported to the 
United States for sale without the copyright holder’s authorization.46  The Quality 
King Court ultimately caused further confusion in the lower courts regarding 
foreign manufactured copyrighted products. 
B. The Lower Courts Take Quality King Dicta to Heart 
The Circuit Courts struggled over the dicta in Quality King.  The Ninth Circuit in 
Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp. struggled with the Quality King decision when 
it considered whether copyrighted goods manufactured abroad were protected by 
the first sale doctrine when the copyrighted goods were imported into the United 
States against the copyright holder’s express instructions.47  Similarly, the Second 
Circuit in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng faced the question of whether 
copyrighted textbooks manufactured abroad for sale outside the U.S. were 
protected by the first sale doctrine when an exchange student bought the 
copyrighted books in Thailand and subsequently sold them in the United States.48 
The plaintiff in Omega, Omega S.A. manufactures watches in Switzerland, which 
are inscribed with a copyrighted “Omega Globe Design.”49  Costco purchased the 
watches with the copyrighted design from overseas distributors of Omega without 
Omega’s authorization.50  Costco then sold the watches with the copyrighted design 
in California.51  The watches were authorized for foreign sale by Omega, but were 
not authorized for importation or sale in the United States.52  The Ninth Circuit 
attempted to reconcile the Quality King decision with its past decisions in BMG 
Music v. Perez, Parfums Givency, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., and Denbicare U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc.53 
 
 46. See infra Part II.B  and associated footnotes. 
 47. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F. 3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Costco 
Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010). 
 48. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F. 3d 210, 212 (2nd Cir. 2011). 
 49. Omega, 514 F. 3d at 983. 
 50. Id. at 984. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 987–88.  See generally BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F. 2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that foreign 
manufactured U.S. copyrighted goods are not subject to first sale defense to a § 602 claim of infringement on 
the copyright holder’s importation right); Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc. 38 F. 3d 477 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (holding that importers of foreign manufactured goods could invoke the first sale defense for U.S. 
copyrighted goods manufactured abroad as long as there was an authorized first sale in the United States); 
Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 84 F. 3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the defendant was not 
liable for infringing on Denbicare’s importation right when the foreign manufactured U.S. copyrighted goods at 
issue were imported to the U.S. by a third party). 
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The court reasoned that if it were to allow the first sale doctrine to apply to 
foreign manufactured goods imported and sold in the United States without the 
manufacturer’s authorization, it would be an impermissible extraterritorial 
extension of the United States copyright law.54  The court found that “[C]opies 
covered by the phrase ‘lawfully made under [Title 17]’ in § 109(a) are not simply 
those which are lawfully made by the owner of a U.S. copyright. Something more is 
required. To us, that ‘something’ is the making of the copies within the United 
States, where the Copyright Act applies.”55  The Ninth Circuit developed the rule 
that parties may only raise the first sale doctrine as a defense after a lawful first sale 
in the U.S. has occurred.56  The court ultimately found that its decisions in past 
cases and Omega were not contradictory to the holding in Quality King because 
Quality King upheld the first sale doctrine as a defense to the unauthorized 
importation of copyrighted works manufactured abroad.57 
The Second Circuit in John Wiley & Sons, Inc.  v. Kirtsaeng also grappled with the 
issue of how to apply Quality King to copyrighted books manufactured abroad and 
intended for sale outside the U.S.58  John Wiley & Sons (“Wiley”) publishes 
textbooks for sale in both U.S. and international markets.59  Wiley owns a 
subsidiary, called John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte. Ltd. (“Wiley Asia”), which 
manufactures and sells English textbooks in foreign markets.60  The textbooks 
manufactured and sold through Wiley Asia are limited to importation and sale in 
Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.61  Supap Kirtsaeng had friends and family 
 
 54. Omega, 514 F.3d at 988. (“Recognizing the importance of avoiding international conflicts of law in the 
area of intellectual property, however, we have applied a more robust version of this presumption to the 
Copyright Act, holding that the Act presumptively does not apply to conduct that occurs abroad even when that 
conduct produces harmful effects within the United States.”) (citing Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns 
Co., 24 F. 3d 1088, 1096–98 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 55. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 56. Id. at 989 (citing Drug Emporium, 38 F. 3d at 481 and Denbicare 84 F. 3d at 1150). 
 57. Id. at 990 (citing 2 Goldstein on Copyright § 7.6.1, at 143–44). 
 58. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F. 3d 210, 212 (2nd Cir. 2011). The Second Circuit decision is 
hereinafter referred to as “Wiley.” 
 59. Id. at 212.  
 60. Id. at 213.  
 61. Id. The legend marking the internationally distributed textbooks reads: 
This book is authorized for sale in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East only [and] may not 
be exported. Exportation from or importation of this book to another region without the 
Publisher’s authorization is illegal and is a violation of the Publisher’s rights. The Publisher may 
take legal action to enforce its rights. The Publisher may recover damages and costs, including 
but not limited to lost profits and attorney’s fees, in the event legal action is required. Id.  
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in Thailand send him the foreign edition textbooks sold through Wiley Asia and 
resold the textbooks online in the United States for a profit.62 
The Second Circuit found the wording of the first sale doctrine to be unclear.63  
The court relied on the dicta in Quality King stating,  “[§ 602(a)(1)] ‘applies to a 
category of copies that are neither piratical nor ‘lawfully made under this title.’ That 
category encompasses copies that were ‘lawfully made’ not under the United States 
copyright Act, but instead, under the law of some other country.’ “64  The court 
found that the Supreme Court viewed “copies ‘lawfully made’ under the laws of a 
foreign country – though perhaps not produced in violation of any United States 
laws – are not necessarily ‘lawfully made’ insofar as that phrase is used in § 109(a) 
of our Copyright Act.”65  After addressing the dicta in Quality King, the Second 
Circuit found that Kirtsaeng was not permitted to present a first sale doctrine 
defense and that “lawfully made” applies only to copyrighted goods that are 
manufactured where the Copyright Act governs.66 
The split between Omega and Wiley led the Court to grant certiorari to Wiley in 
order to resolve the issue. The Court ultimately resolved that copyrighted products 
manufactured and first sold abroad still exhaust the copyright holder’s exclusive 
right to distribution.67 
IV. The Supreme Court Finally Settles Controversies Over the First 
Sale Doctrine in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
In a 6-3 opinion, the Court in Kirtsaeng held that the first sale doctrine applies 
when copyrighted works are lawfully made and sold abroad before importation for 
sale in the U.S.68  The opinion changed the scope of United States copyright law in 
favor of an international exhaustion regime.69 
A. The Majority Opinion Rules for International Copyright Exhaustion 
 
 62. Id.  Kirtsaeng made approximately $1.2 million in revenues through reselling the cheaper foreign 
textbooks in the U.S. market. Id. at 215. 
 63. Id. at 220. 
 64. Id. at 221 (quoting Quality King Distribs. V. L’Anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135, 147 (1998)). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 222. 
 67. See infra, Part IV. 
 68. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355–56 (2013). This ruling applies to actual 
copyrighted works such as books or works of art. Copyrights on box labels such as those at issue in Denbicare 
U.S.A. v. Toys “R” Us, 84 F. 3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1996), Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th 
Cir. 2008), Parfums Givency v. Drug Emporium, 38 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1994), and other such cases may fall 
outside the scope of this ruling due to the crime of copyright misuse. This paper does not attempt to address 
those cases, but limits its reasoning to only legitimately copyrightable works. 
 69. Id. at 1371. 
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The Supreme Court carefully considered the language, background, and policy 
interests behind § 109(a) and § 602(a)(1). The Court determined that the right of 
first sale applied to all lawful copyright transactions regardless of where the 
transactions took place.70  In its decision, the Court struck down a geographical 
interpretation of the right of first sale by determining that if Congress intended the 
act to apply only to national sales, the wording of the statute would include limiting 
language to that effect.71 
First, the Court examined the phrase “lawfully made under this title” to 
determine its statutory meaning.72  Reading the word “under” to have its most 
common meaning, the Court found that none of the words in the phrase mean 
“where.”73  A geographic interpretation, according to the majority, is problematic 
because a case where a product could be unlawfully made under Title 17 cannot be 
conceived.74  Thus, the majority concluded that a nongeographic interpretation is 
the only one that makes linguistic sense.75 
The majority then turned to the history of the first sale doctrine and its 
codification in the 1909 Copyright Act and concluded that the first sale doctrine 
never had a geographic interpretation.76  The Court established that change in 
language from the 1909 act stating “lawfully obtained” and the current wording of 
“lawfully made under this title” prevents lessees or bailees from reselling works they 
had not purchased and then claiming a defense under the first sale doctrine.77  
Further, the Court found that the removal of a geographic requirement to the 
importation of copyrighted works published outside the U.S. provides evidence that 
the right of first sale also applies to the importation of copyrighted works 
manufactured outside the U.S.78 The Court’s inspection of the Copyright Act 
demonstrated that when the language “lawfully made under this title” was used in 
other sections of the Act, it did not place geographic limitations on the rights 
conferred in those sections.79 
 
 70. Id. at 1359–64.  
 71. Id. at 1360. 
 72. Id. at 1358 (observing that section 109 does not explicitly state that there is a geographic limit to its 
interpretation). 
 73. Id. at 1359. Because the everyday use of “under” does not describe a geographic location, the court 
rejected John Wiley’s argument concerning geographic restrictions. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1360. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1362. The Court also reasoned that there was no intended geographic limit to the right of first 
sale in section 109 because the geographic limitations of the manufacturing clause had been removed from the 
copyright statutes. The manufacturing clause, before removal, limited the importation of copyrighted products 
printed outside the U.S. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1361–62. 
 79. Id. at 1362. 
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The Court then turned to the legislative history and surrounding sections of the 
Copyright Act, finding no indication that § 109 is limited as a defense only to 
products made within the United States.80  With no Congressional record qualifying 
application of the first sale doctrine, the Court concluded that the first sale doctrine 
must limit the copyright owner’s exclusive right to importation.81 
The Court considered several policy arguments when determining that the first 
sale doctrine should terminate the copyright holder’s interest in downstream 
control after the lawful first sale of a copyrighted product regardless of geography.  
According to the majority, the first sale doctrine relieves the courts of determining 
whether the importation or sale of untraceable copyrighted goods is lawful.82  
Additionally a geographic interpretation of § 109 could prevent libraries from 
importing rare foreign copies of books, or allow third parties to challenge a library’s 
ownership of an imported work.83  Allowing copyright owners to maintain control 
of subsequent sales of gray market goods would restrict the sale and distribution of 
works of art, books, and possibly even cars with copyrighted mechanisms unless the 
consumers obtained individual permission to sell those items from copyright 
holders.84  The majority determined that this restriction would be contrary to the 
Constitution’s grant to Congress to promote the sciences and arts.85 
In addition to the impact a national copyright regime would have on libraries 
and second-hand booksellers, the majority opined that Copyright holders could 
then exert downstream control even when importation is authorized.86  In a 
concurring statement, Justice Kagan agreed that a geographic interpretation of the 
Copyright Act would encourage manufactures to move their businesses abroad.87 
The Court held that the wording of § 109 indicates that the first sale doctrine 
should apply to all legal sales of copyrighted works despite their place of 
manufacture.  The exclusive right to importation codified in § 602(a)(1) continues 
to provide a statutory remedy for copyright holders preventing the importation of 
 
 80. Id. at 1370. The Court turned to the legislative history and a report stating that the copyright owner’s 
right to distribution does not impact anyone who lawfully purchases a copyrighted work and then wishes to 
transfer that work to someone else. Id. The Court also concluded that the draft of § 602(a) making 
unauthorized importation copyright infringement is limited by the first sale doctrine because it does not 
reference § 106 at all. Id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 1363. 
 83. Id. at 1364. 
 84. Id. at 1365. Discussing a list of horrible outcomes, the Court hypothesizes, “[a] geographical 
interpretation would prevent the resale of, say, a car, without the permission of the holder of each copyright on 
each piece of copyrighted automobile software.” Id. 
 85. Id. at 1364. 
 86. Id. at 1366. 
 87. Id. at 1372 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
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pirated works or sales by licensees.88  The right of first sale protects consumer 
interests in their ability to control products legally purchased and owned.89 
 
B. The Dissenting Opinion Rejects International Copyright Exhaustion as an Adequate 
Compromise Between Consumers and Copyright Holders 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Kennedy and Scalia, wrote the dissenting 
opinion in Kirtsaeng.  Justice Ginsburg in the dissent asserts that the Court’s ruling 
is contrary to the purpose of the copyright statute to protect the interests of 
copyright holders.90  Justice Ginsburg claims that § 602(a)(1) supports a national 
exhaustion regime due to its limitation on unauthorized importation of 
copyrighted goods.91  An international exhaustion regime greatly favors the rights of 
consumers over those of copyright holders.92 
In the dissent, Justice Ginsburg further argues that copyright owners possess an 
economic incentive in segmenting markets and establishing price discrimination in 
various international regions.93  Quality King provided an interpretation of the 
copyright statutes that provides protection of copyright holders who oppose the 
importation of goods made specifically for international markets.94  National 
copyright regimes, Justice Ginsburg argues, provide the most incentive for 
copyright owners to produce creative works because it ensures the copyright holder 
will be sufficiently compensated.95  Consumer interest in obtaining low-cost 
products is secondary to the policy of promoting the creation of creative works 
through payment incentives for copyright holders.96 
Justice Ginsburg further argues that § 602(a)(1) provides “vertical restraints” on 
distributors to sell copyrighted works.97 This allows copyright holders and 
distributors to benefit from exclusive sales and distribution agreements.98 Allowing 
the first sale doctrine to prohibit an unauthorized importation argument under § 
602(a)(1) potentially discourages copyright holders from creating new works due to 
 
 88. Id. at 1368. 
 89. Id. at 1361. 
 90. Id. at 1373 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 1384.  
 92. See infra Part V. 
 93. Kirtsaeng, 133 S.Ct. at 1374 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. In Quality King, the Court hypothesized that a U.S. distribution company with exclusive rights to 
sell a British work would have a claim against a U.K. distributor that attempted to sell the same work in the 
United States. 523 U.S. 135, 148 (1998). 
 95. Id. at 1384. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1385. 
 98. Id. 
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an inability to control the sales and distribution of their products.99  Although 
international copyright frameworks opens copyrighted goods to competition from 
inexpensive imports and benefits consumers, national copyright exhaustion 
expands the monetary incentive for copyright holders to create new works.100 
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg argues that interpreting the first sale doctrine as 
inapplicable to the unauthorized importation of copyrighted works makes § 
602(a)(1) superfluous and does not meet Congress’ intention for including the 
section.101  The Copyright Act already provides protections for libraries and 
museums so that they do not need the first sale doctrine to defend their right to 
exhibit or lease copyrighted works.102  The exceptions under § 602(1)(3) for 
governmental, scholarly, educational, and religious importation of copyrighted 
works protect libraries and museums from copyright holders contesting the 
importation of their foreign manufactured works.103  Justice Ginsburg argues that 
the majority’s holding makes those provisions of the Copyright Act superfluous.104  
The dissent concludes that the majority’s holding eliminates all relevancy of § 602, 
not just the importation protections under § 602(a)(1).105 
Justice Ginsburg asserts that the Court imposed an international exhaustion 
regime on the United States despite there being no precedent in favor of this 
regime.106  The new Copyright Act interpretation provides no protection for those 
copyright owners who wish to manufacture lower quality products for sale in 
foreign markets for reduced prices in order to make products available 
worldwide.107 
The inability to control prices through restricted importation of copyrighted 
goods to the United States could cause copyright holders to find new ways to 
control the downstream market and maximize profits.108  However, the majority 
opinion in Kirtsaeng indicated a new avenue that some copyright holders with the 
ability to switch to digital media may employ: the first sale doctrine of § 109(a) does 
not apply to licensees.109 
 
 99. Id. at 1384. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 1378. Justice Ginsburg concludes that the court strips all meaning from § 602(a) because it offers 
no protection to copyright owners as a remedy for unlawful importation of works. Id. at 1388. 
 102. Id. at 1379. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1388. 
 106. Id. 1386–88. 
 107. Id. at 1388. 
 108. See, supra Part III.B. 
 109. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1368. 
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V. Kirtsaeng and the Grey Market  
At issue in Kirtsaeng was the legal treatment of copyrighted grey market goods 
imported into the United States, also called parallel imports.  Parallel importation is 
the practice of importing foreign manufactured goods without authorization from 
the copyright holder; the grey market is a common term for reselling parallel 
imports in the United States.110 The United States Copyright Act grants copyright 
holders of copyrighted goods the exclusive right to distribution of the copyrighted 
goods, subject to the first sale doctrine.111  However, the Copyright Act also grants 
copyright holders the exclusive right to importation of copyrighted works in § 
602(a)(1).112  When a copyrighted product is sold, the copyright holder’s right to 
distribution of that particular work is exhausted, ending the copyright holder’s 
ability to control the sale or importation of that work.113 
The process of importing goods a copyright holder manufactures and sells 
outside the U.S. is called “parallel importation” because the copyrighted goods are 
introduced into markets parallel to the authorized distribution channels of the 
copyright holder.114  Different countries and regions have developed various 
approaches to copyright exhaustion, limiting exhaustion to the first sale nationally, 
regionally, or internationally.115  The different copyright exhaustion schemes offer 
different levels of control to copyright holders, and therefore different benefits to 
consumers.116 
International exhaustion terminates the copyright owner’s interest in a 
copyrighted product after the first lawful sale anywhere in the world, regardless of 
place of manufacture or where in the world the transaction takes place.117  Regional 
exhaustion limits the termination of copyrights to the first sale within a particular 
region, but allows copyright holders to maintain control over sale of the copyright 
for sales outside the established region.118  National exhaustion works similarly to 
regional exhaustion, ending the copyright holder’s interest in the product after the 
first sale in a particular country, but allows the copyright owner to maintain control 
 
 110. Gautam, supra note 17, at 724. 
 111. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2010). 
 112. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) (2010). 
 113. Pope, supra note 4, at 205. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 207. 
 116. Id. at 206.  
 117. Id. at 207. 
 118. Irene Calboli, Article: Corporate Strategies, First Sale Rules, and Copyright Misuse: Waiting for Answer 
from Kirtsaeng v. Wiley and Omega v. Costco (II), 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 221, 224–25 (2013). 
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of copyrights when legal sales happen outside the nation.119  Nations employ each of 
the three exhaustion schemes to achieve their unique market objectives.120 
Varying public and economic policy objectives determine how a country will 
construct its copyright exhaustion regime and stance on parallel imports.121  
Copyright holders in developed nations generally oppose the importation of grey 
market goods because the parallel imports sell at a lower price than the same goods 
explicitly authorized for sale in a developed country’s market.122  Copyright 
exhaustion seeks to balance the interests of copyright owners and the U.S. policy of 
allowing the public to access the lowest priced goods through free movement of 
legitimate products.123  Copyright holders generally oppose international copyright 
exhaustion because restricting importation of copyrighted goods through 
unauthorized channels permits copyright holders to segment international 
markets.124  The segmentation allows copyright holders to implement price 
discrimination and other customization techniques.125  Price discrimination allows 
copyright holders to sell copies of a copyrighted work more cheaply in developing 
markets than in more developed markets.126 
There are several ways to implement price discrimination between international 
markets.127  Third-degree price discrimination is the practice of charging different 
prices to buyers based on external circumstances, such as geography.128  This 
practice is only feasible if arbitrage is limited between the two markets.129  Second-
degree price discrimination—or  versioning—requires the copyright holder to sell 
different versions of the product for different prices and hope that consumers will 
 
 119. Id. at 224. 
 120. See generally Pope, supra note 4, at 216. The Canadian Copyright Act Article 27 states that importers of 
parallel goods can be found guilty of infringement. Id. at 220. If plaintiffs can prove that importers should have 
known that if the product had been manufactured in Canada, the manufacture would have infringed on the 
copyright, then the import can be barred. Id. Australia explicitly carves out qualifications to a copyright owner’s 
control over importation of certain types of goods. Id. Books manufactured in signatory countries to the Berne 
Convention or the Universal Copyright Convention can be imported as parallel imports, while books first 
published in Australia and then exported cannot be imported again without infringing on the copyright owner’s 
right to distribution. Id. The European Union employs a regional copyright exhaustion regime, extinguishing a 
copyright holder’s control over products after the first legal sale within the EU, but permitting the copyright 
holder to control sales of the work made outside the EU. Id.  
 121. Calboli, supra note 118, at 224. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. at 226. 
 124. Pope, supra note 4, at 206. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Guy A. Rub, The Economics of Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: The Efficiency of a Balanced 
Approach to the First Sale Doctrine, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 41, 44 (2013). 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. Arbitrage is the practice of purchasing items in developing nations and reselling them in developed 
markets. Id. 
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pay more for the most up to date version.130  Copyright holders then sell the most 
up to date versions at higher prices in developed nations, and outdated versions to 
developing markets at a lower price.131  However, this system of versioning can be 
expensive because it requires copyright holders to keep two or more versions of a 
copyrighted product in circulation.132 
Implementing an international exhaustion regime and prohibiting copyright 
holders who sell in the United States from segmenting that market could have a 
negative impact on markets worldwide.133  In such a regime, copyright holders are 
unlikely to sell their goods at a uniform price that is inexpensive enough for 
consumers in developing nations to afford because the copyright holder will see a 
striking decline in revenue.134  For that reason, copyright holders are likely to 
increase the price of their goods in all markets, thereby harming consumers in 
developed nations facing a considerable price increase.135  Producers of copyrighted 
goods that have larger markets in the developed world are even more likely to 
increase the price of their products worldwide to match the price of their goods sold 
in developed countries.136  For example, copyright holders of textbooks are more 
likely to implement a worldwide pricing scheme that matches the price of textbooks 
in the United States because most native English speakers live in the United 
States.137  Increased international arbitrage in the U.S. is likely to increase the price 
of goods worldwide because copyright holders will likely seek the highest price for 
their goods at the detriment of consumers in developing markets.138 
Another reason limiting copyright exhaustion to national or regional regimes is 
preferable over implementing international regimes, is that through market 
segmentation copyright holders sell lower quality versions of their goods in 
developing markets for prices accessible to consumers.  Pearson Education 
manufactures textbooks in foreign markets that are of a lower quality than those 
manufactured and sold within the United States, which allows them to sell English-
language textbooks to foreign markets at reduced prices.139  Thus, regional and 
national regimes allow publishers like Pearson Education to have a certain prestige 
in American markets without being tarnished by lesser quality grey market goods 
that may otherwise be sold within the United States under an international 
 
 130. Id. at 45. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 46. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 47. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Pearson Educ. Inc., v. Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d 407, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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regime.140  Pearson textbooks manufactured for sale in the United States are printed 
with hardcover bindings and are accompanied by academic supplements such as 
CD-ROMs.141  In contrast, the textbooks manufactured for foreign markets are 
printed on lower quality paper, contain lower quality photographs and graphics, 
and do not come with academic supplements.142 This market segmentation stems 
from a copyright holder’s ability to control importations of copyrighted works 
between the markets and is destroyed in an international copyright regime.143 
Proponents of international copyright exhaustion argue that market 
segmentation and price discrimination have a negative impact on developing 
nations and prevents consumers from accessing legitimate goods at lower prices.144  
Market segmentation is often seen as price gouging because products are 
significantly higher in developed markets.145  International copyright exhaustion 
supports the interests of consumers because it terminates the copyright holder’s 
control after the first legal sale, regardless of place of manufacture or sale.146 
Additionally, geographically limiting the first sale doctrine’s application to goods 
manufactured within the United States presents legitimate concerns.  In his dissent 
to John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng in the Second Circuit decision, Judge Murtha 
notes that preventing the first sale doctrine from applying to lawfully copyrighted 
works manufactured abroad could create high transaction costs and “lead to 
uncertainty in the secondary market.”147  For example, copyright holders who 
manufactured copyrighted goods outside the United States and sold them within 
the United States could maintain control over the sale of particular copyrighted 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Kumar, 721 F. Supp. 2d 166, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 142. Id. at 172. 
 143. See generally, Pope, supra note 4, at 207.  Business Software Alliance wrote in its brief to the court that 
ruling in favor of the first sale doctrine’s application in Kirtsaeng would deprive foreign markets of affordable 
goods. Eduardo Porter, “Copyright Ruling Rings with Echo of Betamax,” New York Times (March 26, 2013) 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/business/in-a-copyright-ruling-the-lingering-legacy-of-the-
betamax.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
 144. Pope, supra note 4, at 208. Governments take different stances on grey market goods based on varying 
circumstances in their nation, taking into account the economic and public policy interests. Id.  
 145. Doug Kari, “How an eBay bookseller defeated a publishing giant at the Supreme Court”, ArsTechnica 
(March 22, 2015) available at http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/11/how-an-ebay-bookseller-defeated-a-
publishing-giant-at-the-supreme-court/1/. 
 146. Pope, supra note 4 at 204. The Southern District of New York found that copyright owners who control 
all commercial transactions of products would produce higher transaction costs, undermining the plaintiff’s 
argument that 17 U.S.C. § 109 should not apply to parallel imports of books manufactured outside the U.S. 
Pearson Educ. Inc., v. Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d 407, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The court further reasoned that although 
products manufactured and sold in foreign markets receive less compensation for those products sold within 
the U.S., the vendors are not required to sell products in foreign markets or at lower prices. Companies that sell 
discounted or second-hand items experience a negative impact from a copyright holder’s control over the 
importation of grey market goods. Id.  
 147. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 227 (2nd Cir. 2011). 
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works even after the first sale, giving those copyright holders more control than 
domestic copyright holders.148 
The Supreme Court in Kirtsaeng attempted to create a consumer-friendly 
copyright regime that ensured unlimited access to cheaper grey market goods.149  
However, because the Court stated that license agreements are not subject to the 
first sale doctrine, the opinion permits the use of coercive EULAs to subvert the 
purpose of international copyright exhaustion.150 
VI. The Rise of End User License Agreements in the Digital Age 
The Supreme Court noted in Kirtsaeng that § 602(a)(1) enables copyright holders to 
restrict licensees of copyrighted products from importing the copyrighted products 
without authorization.151 This permits copyright holders to exert downstream 
control of products by issuing licenses to, rather than selling, copyrighted goods.152  
Although a switch to licensing digital goods as opposed to selling physical works 
may give copyright holders more downstream control by preventing consumers 
from copying or transferring the copyrighted products, it is likely the detriments to 
consumers will be minimal in the long-term due to a switch in the current digital 
market.153 
A. Licenses and the First Sale Doctrine 
Digital works are generally sold with EULAs, asserting that purchasers are 
“licensees” of the product rather than “owners.”154  Drafting a license agreement 
precludes the application of the first sale doctrine to the transaction because no 
transfer of title has taken place.155  Therefore, through the use of well-written 
EULAs, copyright owners can retain title to their works and restrict a purchaser 
from selling, leasing, or modifying the product.156  Holders of valid licenses cannot 
assert the first sale doctrine as a defense. 157 
In order to avoid a party asserting the first sale doctrine’s protections, the EULA 
must be a valid license agreement, and not a disguised sale. In Vernor v. Autodesk, 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. See supra Part IV.A. 
 150. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1368 (2013). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Carver, supra note 16, at 1889. 
 153. See infra Part V. 
 154. Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 901–02 (2010). 
 155. Carver, supra note 16, at 1889. 
 156. Id. at 1895. 
 157. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) “The first sale doctrine does not apply to 
a person who possesses a copy of the copyrighted work without owning it, such as a licensee.” Id. 
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Inc. the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals employed a two-prong test to determine 
whether the transferee of software was an owner or a licensee.158  First, the court 
stated, “Thus, under Wise, where a transferee receives a particular copy of a 
copyrighted work pursuant to a written agreement, we consider all of the provisions 
of the agreement to determine whether the transferee became an owner of the copy 
or received a license.”159  The court went on to find three considerations to 
determine when a software user is a licensee rather than an owner: (1) “specifies 
that a user is granted a license”; (2) “significantly restricts the user’s ability to 
transfer the software”; and (3) “imposes notable use restrictions.”160 
The Ninth Circuit in UMG Recordings, Inc., v. Augusto determined that perpetual 
possession made an EULA more like a sale than a license.161  In that case, the 
plaintiff, UMG Recordings, sent out promotional CDs but never attempted to 
retrieve them and nothing on their packaging indicated the CDs needed to be 
returned.162  Additionally, the CDs were not numbered and UMG did not attempt 
to track the CDs use or location.163  Therefore, Augusto could invoke the first sale 
doctrine as a defense to his resale of the software because the indefinite nature of 
the “license” agreement made the transaction more like a sale.164 
Other courts have determined whether a license agreement is actually a sale by 
evaluating several factors.  In DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc’ns, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a license agreement because the agreement 
provided sufficient restrictions to avoid First Sale Doctrine application as it 
restricted transfer of the software, prohibited the use of the product on hardware 
not manufactured by DCS, and limited the use of the software to employees on a 
“need to know basis.”165  Similarly, in Novell, Inc. v. Unicom Sales, Inc. the District 
Court for the Northern District of California determined that the purchaser, 
Unicom, was a licensee rather than an owner because the software bought from 
Frederick County Public Schools was to be returned to the copyright holder after a 
year.166  Another set of software sold to Frederick County Public Schools provided 
 
 158. Id. at 1109. The court then considered “(1) whether the agreement was labeled a license and (2) 
whether the copyright owner retained title to the copy, required its return or destruction, forbade its 
duplication, or required the transferee to maintain possession of the copy for the agreement’s duration.” Id. 
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license, (b) provided that the copyright owner retained title to the prints, (c) required the return or destruction 
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 164. Id. at 1183. 
 165. 170 F.3d 1354, 1361–62 (1999). 
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that the school could use the software indefinitely but had to destroy or return it if 
any of the license terms were breached.167  The court found that this requirement of 
returning or destroying the software copies received was sufficient to construe a 
license rather than sales agreement.168  At least one court has considered factors 
other than length of the agreement’s term.  In Krause v. Titleserv, Inc. the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that if a purchaser of a work could fix software if it 
had problems, destroy or throw it away, and make a backup copy, then there were 
enough incidents of ownership present to construe the license agreement as a sales 
contract.169 
A court has wide discretion when determining whether an EULA is a license 
agreement, in which title remains with the copyright holder, or a sale, in which title 
vests with the purchaser.  The distinction between a license and a sale determines 
how much control over subsequent transfers the copyright holder retains, because a 
sale is subject to the first sale doctrine protections, while a license is not. 
B. EULAs Provide More Control to Copyright Holders 
The Kirtsaeng holding weakened a copyright holder’s ability to control the 
importation of physical copyrighted goods, but digital media is still subject to 
market segmentation.170  Copyright holders may still retain control of distribution 
by switching to digital formats and offering EULAs so that, pursuant to the license 
agreement, the textbooks or other digital media cannot be transferred.171 
The terms and conditions of EULAs for digital copyrighted works 
overwhelmingly favor copyright holders.172  For example, despite removing digital 
rights management mechanisms (“DRM”) from its content in 2009,173 iTunes still 
limits copies of its digital media to personal use only, restricts the number of 
permitted devices, and limits the number of times files can be copied on to a CD.174  
Amazon and Google also limit users’ rights to transfer ownership of the digital 
media. 
The permissibility of market segmentation permits copyright holders of digital 
works to sell purely digital media at higher prices in different markets.  For 
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example, Apple was investigated for antitrust violations when it was revealed the 
company sold songs at a higher price in the U.K. than elsewhere in Europe.175  
Digital goods such as songs, iPhone applications, and whole albums were found to 
cost forty-six percent more in Australia than the same digital works cost in the 
United States.176  By contrast, goods in the Mexico iTunes store cost less than those 
sold in the United States.177  Apple is able to segment markets and avoid 
international arbitrage because its digital goods are licensed rather than sold. 
The transfer of purely digital copyrighted works implicates a different right 
under the Copyright Act than those at issue in Kirtsaeng.178  Transferring digital 
works violates a copyright holder’s exclusive right to reproduction rather than 
distribution.179  Licenses to purely digital works provide restrictions of sale because 
each digital copy is a perfect copy, unmarred by use or time.180  Copying digital 
works and sending them to friends allows the original purchaser to keep a copy of 
the work also, an issue wholly different from the sale and transfer of a copyrighted 
physical product.181 Therefore potentially violating the copyright holder’s exclusive 
right to reproduction. 
Secondary markets for digital works are currently unworkable because 
transferring digital works violates a copyright holder’s exclusive right to 
reproduction. For example, in Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York held that a secondary market for digital 
music was an infringement of copyright holder’s reproduction and distribution 
rights, and therefore received no protection from the first sale doctrine.182  In 
ReDigi, the website allowed users to upload songs and offer them for sale, then once 
a song is offered for sale, the seller’s access to the file is terminated.183  While users 
were required by ReDigi to delete the music files sold, the files are not deleted 
automatically and users are left to delete the files themselves after an upload.184  The 
court determined that users made unauthorized copies of the works in order to 
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upload the digital music file to the ReDigi website.185  These copies infringed upon 
the copyright holder’s exclusive right to reproduction of their copyrighted works.186  
Because a new copy of the file was created on ReDigi’s website after the music was 
uploaded, the court determined that the works were not “lawfully made under this 
title” and deserved no first sale doctrine protections.187 
The lack of first sale protection for transfers of digital works and the added 
infringement of a copyright holder’s exclusive right to distribution makes digital 
media an attractive option for copyright holders looking to maintain market 
segmentation and control.  The ReDigi court found the possibility of a digital 
secondary market is currently unworkable, providing copyright holders a safe 
medium for offering copyrighted works.188 
C. Is the Switch to Digital Media Necessarily Bad for Consumers? 
The move to digital media had demonstrated a shift in how purchasers consume 
copyrighted digital products.189  A shift from “ownership” to “use” may make the 
holding of Kirtsaeng irrelevant in a market where unlimited streaming subscriptions 
and other forms of licensure give consumers access to vast libraries of digital 
content without the consumers ever purchasing a single copyrighted digital work.190  
Copyright holders choosing to sell textbooks or other copyrighted goods that can be 
sold in a digital format may be able to control distribution and still provide content 
under terms that are acceptable to consumers. 
Recently, services providing paid subscriptions to vast libraries of copyrighted 
digital content have emerged across digital media: Netflix provides streaming of 
movies and television shows, Spotify and Pandora provide streaming of music, and 
Scribd allows subscribers to access a library of e-books.191  These type of subscriber 
based services provide reliable streams of regular income for copyright holders.192  
Consumers paying for monthly subscriptions do not own the content they access 
on the website, but the ability to access and use libraries of digital content removes 
the necessity of ownership.193 
Despite the court’s finding in ReDigi that secondary markets in purely digital 
goods unworkable, Apple and Amazon are working on ways to create a secondary 
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market for their digital content.  Amazon already permits users of e-books to lend 
books to their friends, provided the publisher has opted to allow this service.194  Its 
digital resale patent is based on the current model of lending e-books between 
users.195  If an e-book user on Amazon decided to “sell” an e-book to another user, 
the original user will no longer be able to use the e-book after the sale.196  The book 
will remain on the original user’s device until it is manually deleted, but the original 
user will not be able to access the content.197  Apple has also filed a patent 
application for a service that would allow the resale of digital content bought 
through iTunes.198  Apple’s patent provides a mechanism for sending some of the 
proceeds of the sale of digital media on the secondary market to the copyright 
holder.199  These secondary digital marketplaces would give consumers resale rights 
over their licensed digital media.200  However, Apple and Amazon would maintain 
control over the secondary marketplace, resale pricing, and copyrights of the digital 
works by implementing license agreements dictated by the copyright holders and 
moving away from true ownership.201 
Furthermore, in the textbook market, consumers may be less disturbed by 
market “lock in” or the inability to switch freely between devices because students 
often have little choice in their textbooks.202  The trend towards renting physical 
copies of books, rather than retaining permanent ownership, is apparent through 
universities offering textbook rentals and the success of companies such as Chegg.203  
For the limited market of textbook publishing, a switch to licensing digital copies of 
books used in a single medium may have only a minimal impact on the current 
consumer textbook market. 
Although the Kirtsaeng ruling may accelerate the publishing industry’s move to 
join music and movies in the digital realm, the transition may not harm consumers 
as drastically as was once assumed.  Subscription services have become popular 
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among consumers and removed the need for absolute ownership of works.  
Similarly, despite not actually “owning” the digital media, mechanisms allowing 
users to transfer files through Apple and Amazon services may allow users more 
freedom and incentive to purchase in the digital marketplace, and allow the 
subscription providers to have a secondary market. 
VII. Conclusion  
The Supreme Court drastically modified the law when it ruled in Kirtsaeng that the 
first sale doctrine applied to works manufactured outside the U.S., purchased, 
imported to the United States, and subsequently sold for profit.204  By adopting an 
international regime system of copyright exhaustion the Court’s decision seemingly 
protects consumer interests because importers can now purchase copyrighted 
works in cheaper foreign markets, import them, and sell them at a lower price 
relative to licensed U.S. distributors.205  Purchasers of these grey market goods are 
able to take advantage of the relatively cheaper prices to the detriment of copyright 
owners.206 This holding may incentivize publishers to switch to primarily digital 
formats for their textbooks in order to take advantage of the control offered by 
EULAs.207  While copyright holders of media subject to EULAs may switch to a 
digital market to maintain more control over their goods, a switch in the consumer 
marketplace to subscription services and the development of a digital secondary 
market may make the switch to digital media irrelevant.208  As consumers become 
more concerned with access to wider collections of digital content through 
subscription services or digital media rentals, lack of actual ownership of the 
products, and therefore lack of copyright holder control, may not drastically harm 
consumers.209 
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